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Abstract: The achievement of sustainable development (SD) in the supply of minerals poses
significant challenges for governments and public administrations on all levels, because ensuring
a sustainable supply constitutes a “wicked” problem that has no clear set of alternative solutions
due to its social, institutional and scientific complexities. This paper explores how this problem is
addressed through “governance for SD” principles (horizontal policy integration and participation;
long-term vision/short-term action; and reflexivity and learning) in the design and delivery of
national mineral policy strategies (NMS) in five EU Member States (Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal
and Sweden). Following a grounded theory approach on data collected through document analysis
and complementary qualitative interviews, the author identified several analytical categories for the
selected governance for SD’ principles. Although no “one-size-fits-all” recipe for best practice on
governance for SD exists in the five NMS, Finland, Portugal and Sweden meet high standards: These
NMS display practical examples of governance for SD integration and, thus, lay the foundations for
achieving policy outcomes in the sectoral policy strategies of the mineral supply.
Keywords: sustainable development; governance; mineral policy; policy strategy; wicked problems
1. Introduction
Europe’s socio-economic development strongly depends on the secure and sustainable supply of
minerals, such as Neodymium and Cobalt. In the past few years, among 41 economically important
minerals and metals, the number of critical ones classified by the European Commission increased
from 14 to 20 [1,2]. In the EU, at least 30 million jobs rely on the availability of raw materials, in general,
as well as delivering new and innovative products [3]. As such, several European Member States
established more strategic policy approaches (e.g., integrated strategies and action plans) to secure
supply by facilitating primary mineral production. However, barriers to effective policies include
the need to ensure public acceptance of mining operations, coherence with other policy areas, and
business investment in order to manage primary production sustainably [4,5]. To effectively deal with
these complex dynamics, the governance of mineral policy needs to address certain underlying factors.
As outlined by Bringezu et al. [6], the academic debate in the field of resource governance
focuses mostly on the effectiveness of single policy instruments in local or regional settings (e.g.,
permitting procedures [7]), one of the facets of the complex dynamics of the mineral supply (e.g.,
public acceptance [8]), or the overall mineral policy framework [9,10]. However, less emphasis has
been placed on the underlying factors of the policy governance framework for managing the complex
dynamics of primary mineral production. To date, only a few limited regional studies covering the
mineral policy governance framework, all of which were outside of the EU, have been published (e.g.,
Australia: McAllister et al. [11]; Canada: Everingham et al. [4]).
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Governing the secure and sustainable supply of minerals from primary production faces
particularly complex, “wicked” dynamics [4] (pp. 596–598). Numerous authors, who address this
debate (e.g., Moffat and Zhang [12]), refer to one or several of its three key dynamics as outlined by
Head and Alford [13] (p. 6). At the same time, the European Commission and individual EU Member
States’ mineral policy strategies (henceforth referred to as National Mineral Strategies (NMS)) call for
the application of sustainable development (SD) in tackling this “wicked problem” [14] (p. 12) [15]
(p. 4). The concept of a “wicked problem” approach applies to sustainable minerals supply due
to its inherent relation to poly-rationality of stakeholders and institutional complexity (e.g., mining
policy as a cross-cutting policy area). Thus, it acts as a baseline for the argumentation of an analytical
framework based on governance for sustainable development. Therefore, the author argues that
“governance for SD” not only accounts for the steering requirement of “wicked problems” [16–18]
but, more importantly, is a necessary pre-condition for achieving sustainable development in these
sectoral policy strategies. Consequently, this paper investigates how governance for SD principles, like
horizontal policy integration, participation, long-term vision and short-term action, and reflexivity
and learning, are incorporated into the design and delivery of NMS in five EU Member States (Austria,
Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden).
In Section 2 the paper briefly explains the importance of a sustainable mineral supply in Europe
and then explores the particular complexities of this issue by utilizing the concept of “wicked
problems” and its governance approaches. Sections 3 and 4 outline the rationale of the analytic
framework for governance for SD principles, while Section 5 clarifies the methodological approach.
Through the analysis in Section 6, the author investigates the dynamics of governing a “wicked
problem” and identifies best practice examples in the context of mineral supply in NMS. Although
no “one-size-fits-all” recipe for a best practice case exists in the five NMS, the results indicate that
Finland, Portugal and Sweden meet high standards with regard to governance for SD. Essentially, these
NMS display practical examples for the integration of governance for SD in sectoral concerns, having
established both high political relevance and having contested social and environmental challenges.
The paper concludes by indicating the relevance of governance for SD for both mineral policy and SD
decision makers, as well as strategy development in general.
2. EU Policy Challenges and Responses to the Sustainable Mineral Supply
Sustainable mineral policy is a particularly salient issue, since an economy’s functioning and
society’s well-being depend on a secure and sustainable supply of mineral raw materials. However, the
projected world population growth, associated with a dramatic rise in the demand for raw materials,
raises concerns for their supply [19–21]. Additionally, increasing per capita material consumption
does not only put a strain on resource availability, but also causes negative externalities through waste
and emissions that, in the long-run, will result in environmental damage by surpassing planetary
boundaries [22,23]. This calls for policies that promote sustainable development, specifically in the
area of extraction, efficient use, and recycling of raw materials.
The secure and sustainable supply of raw materials is a particularly relevant issue in the European
Union (EU), due to Europe’s strong import dependency [22,24]. Several factors such as commodity
market distortions [25], competition on different land use types (e.g., mining versus agriculture), raw
material demand for development, and rapid diffusion of key enabling technologies, might further
endanger supply for Europe [26,27]. Consequently, in 2008, the European Commission (EC) established
the Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) to better manage and coordinate responses to non-energy and
non-agricultural raw material supply through a three-pillar approach [1,25].
From the RMI’s three pillars, the second pillar addresses the domestic raw materials production
sector. However, regulatory aspects fall under the competences of the individual EU MS. Facilitated
by the EC expert working group recommendations [28], the RMI recommended the design of NMS,
but it was not obligatory to adopt such strategies at the national level. In total, 10 EU Member States
have designed a NMS to better accommodate the EU mineral policy framework objectives within their
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particular raw material needs and the specific circumstances of their national economies [25]. Thus far,
EU Member States of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom have developed their own mineral strategies in the field of non-energy and
non-agricultural raw materials. According to Rayner and Howlett [29] (p. 100), these NMS represent
so-called “integrated strategies” “to address the perceived shortcomings of previous, more ad hoc,
policy regimes”. NMS share a streamlined policy instrument mix and the coordination of multiple
goals, “so that multiple instruments support rather than undermine one other in the pursuit of those
goals” [29] (p. 101). In the context of mining, Otto [30] (p. 2) first describes these strategies as a
“stand-alone document” that provides guidance to public institutions and stakeholders “ . . . on the
direction and expectation of the nation with regard to regulating the sector”. What kinds of governance
requirements are necessary to promote NMS’ common objective of sustainable and secure mineral
supply is an issue that will be investigated further in this paper.
3. “Wicked Problems” and Their “Clumsy” Solutions
The complex dynamics we encounter when attempting to realize SD or the sustainable mineral
supply are issues that can best be conceptualized as “wicked problems” [31]. “Wicked problems” share
aspects, such as contradictory certitudes (worldviews), that make them particularly challenging [32,33].
Environmental problems and SD issues are particularly “wicked”, due to their inherent complexity and
multitude of interactions of factors and different stakeholders, as well as the political and organisational
inability to address endemic uncertainty and fragmentation in political and institutional terms [34]
(pp. 141–145). Head and Alford [13] (p. 6) condense the problematic nature of “wicked problems”
into three key dynamics (see also Figure 1): social pluralism, institutional complexity and scientific
uncertainty. Managing the supply of minerals sustainably displays “wicked problem” dynamics,
as outlined by, for example, Everingham et al. [4] (pp. 596–598).
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Figure 1. Governance for SD as a “clumsy” solution approach to “wicked problems”.
Considering the dynamics of the sustainable mineral supply as a “wicked problem”, one has to
overcome the preliminary pessimism of Rittel and Webber [31] and approach this as a policy problem
in a pragmatic manner. Rather than through simplification, “wicked problems” have to be addressed
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through a process that considers the dynamics of social issues, as well as technical/scientific aspects
and, thus, recognizes the “essential contestation” of the solution and the definition of the problem
itself [35] (p. 18). Instead of attempting to find one clear solution dictated by technical rationality,
“wicked problems” have to be addressed through an adaptive, collaborative and creative process.
Verweij et al. [36] (p. 818) coined this as finding “clumsy solutions” that are “creative and flexible
combinations of various ways of organizing, perceiving and justifying social relations” and attempting
to adequately reflect the poly-rationality of stakeholders [37] (p. 249). “Clumsy” decision-making,
thus, is a process that is participatory (addressing endemic conflict), iterative (ensuring quality of
communication), and emerging (taking into account the uniqueness of the problem and plural policy
responses) [36] (p. 838).
Respectively, several authors elaborated different “clumsy” solution approaches to consider the
governance of “wicked problems”. For example, Voß et al. [38] explored SD as a governance problem
with three dimensions that are closely related to the key dynamics of “wicked problems”. Others
indicated how “clumsy” methods could inform public policy-making and governance approaches, in
general (e.g., Head and Alford [13]), and sustainable resource management, in particular (e.g., [39–41]).
However, what all these approaches have in common is the application of a set of guiding principles for
governance processes instead of technical/rational thinking or management by strict rules. Similarly,
Meuleman and Niestroy [42] suggested a concept of governance for SD, “Common But Differentiated
Governance”, which draws upon several general principles as a meta-governance approach for
implementing the Global Sustainable Development Goals. Nevertheless, it remains a challenge to
incorporate the exploratory and pluralistic ethos of “clumsy” solution approaches into policy-making
in a meaningful way that works within, and modifies, existing institutional configurations. Thus,
a framework that would enable us to compare and evaluate how governance approaches address
“wicked” SD issues could be of immense utility. This paper attempts such an approach through an
analysis of NMS as the governance instrument to address a “wicked problem”, namely the sustainable
and secure supply of minerals on the national level.
4. Governance for SD Principles as a Clumsy Solution Approach for Sustainable
Minerals Supply
SD is conceptualised as a reflexive process that is facilitated/steered by the normative “governance
for sustainable development principles” [42–45]. Governance for SD, in light of a “wicked problem”,
has to be conceptualised as “steering requirements” that facilitate a continuously emerging policy
approach rather than the management/steering/guiding of the implementation of a particular
policy [16–18,46–49]. These “steering requirements” are conceptualised in this paper through
governance for SD principles that facilitate SD as a “clumsy” solution approach. The following
governance for SD principles are a selection of particularly relevant aspects of our analysis of NMS:
horizontal and vertical policy integration, participation, long-term visioning and short-term action
and reflexivity and learning. Table 1 provides a synopsis of these principles to better put them into
context with the “clumsy” solution approach (outlined in Figure 1).
Governance for SD principles could, therefore, act as a facilitating concept that translates the
“clumsy” approaches that “wicked problems” call for into components that can be better integrated
into the traditional policy cycle. More specifically, they constitute a path to address “wicked problems”
within the policy cycle in a slightly more “clumsy” way, while putting additional emphasis on
organizational problems, such as cross- and inter-ministerial cooperation and learning. Figure 1
illustrates this relationship between the three “wicked problem” key dynamics, the respective “clumsy”
solution approach, and related governance for SD principles as a concrete example thereof.
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Table 1. Governance for SD principles selected for this paper.
Governance for SD Principle Short Description
Integration principle
Policy integration (horizontal) balances economic, social and environmental
interests and policies in a way that trade-offs (or negative effects) between
them are accounted for or minimised, and synergies (or win-win-win
opportunities) are maximised within political institutions [50,51].
Policy integration takes place among multiple levels, or hierarchies, across
political-administrative levels (vertical), as well as territorially (i.e., from
European to national, down to sub-national political-administrative levels).
Participation
Inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders in public policy-making can
have ethical, political (public legitimacy) and knowledge reasons [52].
Quantity versus quality of participation needs to be considered.
Long-term visioning and
short-term action
Generational impacts and nature of societal transition processes call for the
consideration of longer time spans.
A process of elaborated planning is needed to translate these long-term
oriented visions into practical implementation in the more immediate future.
This constitutes a major challenge due to the ambiguity of long-term goals
and uncertainty about knowledge and systems development [38,45].
Meadowcroft [45] argued that this could be addressed by developing longer
term operational objectives and breaking these down into intermediate ones
and measurable targets.
Reflexivity and learning
Unknown dynamics of large scale system transformations, such as the
transition towards a sustainable extractive sector call for reflexive processes
aimed at “reconsidering existing practices, critically appraising current
institutions and exploring alternative futures” [17].
Central to this process is the establishment of effective monitoring and
evaluation systems and subsequent “continuous adaptive learning” [53].
Young [54] summarises this approach as a separate governance strategy
through the process of goal setting that serves to galvanize the efforts of
participants within a specific timeframe and with the benefit of an operational
metric for measuring progress.
In the following paragraphs, the paper outlines briefly why the integration of governance for SD
principles into NMS is relevant in addressing “wicked problems”, such as the secure and sustainable
mineral supply:
Firstly, governance for SD plays a key role, because SD is an intrinsic part of NMS. Essentially, SD
serves as the normative “meta-objective for policy” [45] (p. 307) that is given substance or concretised
in the specific context of mineral policy. On the EU level, the European Commission calls for “defining
a National Minerals Policy to ensure that mineral resources are exploited in an economically viable
way, harmonised with other national policies, based on SD principles ( . . . )” [14] (p. 12). Several
EU Member States’ NMS make an explicit claim towards the inclusion of sustainable development:
References to SD are made in the overall objectives and specific action areas of NMS. For example,
Sweden’s Minerals Strategy [15] (p. 4) highlights that “Sweden’s mineral assets are to be exploited in a
long-term sustainable way, with consideration shown for ecological, social and cultural dimensions”.
Following this proposition for SD in NMS, the author argues that governance for SD principles are the
fundamental basis for applying effective national mineral policy.
Secondly, governance for SD addresses steering limitations when facing the “wicked problem”
of SD [16–18,43,48] or the sustainable and secure mineral supply. These limitations, inter alia,
comprise a lack of necessary authority or means to tackle societal challenges, as well as adequate
general or collective interest and legitimacy. Governance for SD addresses these limitations by
facilitating societal co- or self-steering through communication and collaboration between multiple
societal actors. Participatory or multi-stakeholder involvement principles support governments
through a deliberative process of collecting and generating knowledge to successfully address societal
challenges [45] and guarantee greater commitment, follow up implementation, and acceptance for
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state-designed intervention [55]. This is particularly important in the context of the multi-dimensional
and multi-stakeholder challenges inherent in the sustainable mineral supply through NMS [11,56–64]:
Issues concerning the social licence to operate (e.g., Prno and Slocombe [64]), mining impacts
on ecosystems (e.g., Bridge [56]), long-term business investment decisions for exploration and
extraction, etc., all involve a large number of diverse stakeholders that are directly or indirectly
impacted or involved. These factors are crucial to facilitate legitimacy of policy options and steering
in this multi-stakeholder and multi-issue setting of mineral supply. Consequently, as argued by
McAllister et al. [11] (p. 91), such a (governance for SD) approach “offers an important viable alternative
to current policy efforts”, in particular, in the case of the “mineral sector where sustainability is a
secondary consideration, often added on to existing processes”.
To give some indication of how “wicked problems” are being addressed in the case of the mineral
supply, this paper focuses on the following research questions:
(1) Are governance for SD principles an intrinsic part of NMS?
(2) To what extent do different ministries collaborate, and what are the processes and mechanisms
that define their involvement?
(3) To what extent do NMS integrate non-governmental actors in design and implementation?
(4) How comprehensive and elaborated is the translation of long-term planning into
individual actions?
(5) To what degree do NMS include policy assessment tools?
5. Methods
To explore the role governance for SD principles play in the design, implementation and revision
phases of five NMS, the author chose the following approach:
• A Multiple single-outcome study [65] (pp. 710–713) that focuses on investigating within-case
(different governance for SD features within NMS) and across-case evidence (comparisons of
5 NMS). This, ultimately, gives insights on the multiple (range of phenomena i.e., features
characterising governance for SD) single outcome (governance for SD).
• Small-N qualitative comparisons that take into account the complexity of underlying dynamics
and complex configurations of factors within a particular context [66] (p. 301).
The abovementioned approach informs our sampling, data collection, analysis and analytical
framework, which are explained in the following paragraphs.
Based on Seawright and Gerring [67] (pp. 294–295), the author intentionally chose purposive
sampling instead of a random sampling, due to the small number of cases (i.e., a total of
10 EU MS developed a NMS). Since research design (i.e., small-N qualitative comparative multiple
single-outcome study) and case selection are invariably connected, the author chose the “diverse case
method”, which primarily tries to achieve maximum variance along relevant dimensions. Sample
stratification covered criteria, such as: (i) geological characteristics and diversity of mineral deposits;
(ii) political systems; (iii) strategy development drivers; and (iv) geographical regions. The five NMS
selected for the analysis are: FI: “Finland’s Minerals Strategy” (adopted in 2010); AT: “Austrian
Mineral Resources Plan” (2010); SE: “Sweden’s Minerals Strategy” (2012); GR: “National Policy for the
Exploitation of Mineral Resources” (2012); PT: “National Strategy for Geological Resources—Mineral
Resources” (2012).
Case data collection and analysis used a mixed-method approach: Firstly, the authors conducted
a document analysis of NMS documents to determine the extent to which these documents and
corresponding governance processes coincided with governance for SD principles. In general, NMS
vary greatly in their scope and size (e.g., EU MS have different focus areas). However, these NMS
represent integrated strategies, and have in common a generic structure (see Rayner and Howlett [29])
and are subject to specific processes and mechanisms during their design, implementation and revision
phase. Hence, the NMS’ different focus areas do not impact the comparability on the governance level.
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In a second step, document analysis was complemented by qualitative interviews with five
policymakers from the respective national government ministries of the five selected countries
responsible for the design and implementation of the NMS. The Author interviewed policy makers
from the following ministries (see also Appendix A): Federal Ministry of Science, Research and
Economy (AT); Ministry of Employment and the Economy (FI); Ministry of Environment, Energy and
Climate Change (GR); Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications (SE); General Directorate
of Natural Resources, Security and Maritime Services (PT). The author selected these policymakers
due to their responsibility for, and in-depth knowledge about, the governance processes, and designed
a semi-structured questionnaire with qualitative open-ended questions. This questionnaire guided the
flow of the interview, which lasted between 45 and 90 min. The author conducted five initial interviews
with policymakers during the period from May to July 2014 and, in a later stage, complemented them
by a second round of interviews with the same policymakers from April to June 2015 to further refine
conceptual categories.
To increase validity and comparability of analysis results, both methods, document analysis and
interviews, were conducted by the same researcher. However, the interviews only include the views of
public administrators and, thus, exclude any views and expertise by other stakeholder groups affected
by mineral policy-making.
The Author applied qualitative data-analysis techniques in Grounded Theory to allow the
structure of the findings to emerge from the data: In the first order analysis (a process similar
to open coding according to Strauss and Corbin [68], and recently discussed by Gioia et al. [69])
the author tried to distil as many categories as the data collection (i.e., document analysis and first
round of interviews) allowed for. In the subsequent analysis, the author thought out similarities
and differences among these categories (axial coding) in order to come up with a more manageable
number of categories. This process has been followed by a second round of interviews which has been
informed by more detailed questions based on the first order identified categories. Consequently this
step of data collection and refinement led to the second order analysis which enabled the author to
aggregate identified categories into emerging concepts (i.e., key features) that were complementing or
expand existing literature. Following the above mentioned grounded-theory approach and respective
analysis techniques (for applied research methodology, see also [70–73]), and drawing on insights
from governance for SD literature [16–18], the author identified several categories and their respective
dimensions within the above-mentioned key features.
By investigating the inclusion of governance for SD principles in NMS, the authors identified the
following features through iterative comparative procedures of data collection, analysis and coding:
• Key feature 1: Inclusive actor strategy (related to principles: horizontal policy integration and
participation);
• Key feature 2: Strategic follow-up implementation (related to principle: long-term visioning and
short-term action);
• Key feature 3: Integrated policy learning (related to principle: reflexivity and learning).
Figure 2 below illustrates how the pre-selected governance for SD principles were embedded in
the policy cycle. The overlap of policy cycle elements and governance for SD principles in Figure 2
form the analysis key features 1–3 in the Results Section:
• “Inclusive actor strategy” investigates government actor (category 1) and Non-government actor
(category 2) involvement during the NMS design phase;
• “Strategic follow-up implementation” stresses the degree to which concrete follow up actions
are foreseen (category 1) and to what extent time frames for implementation are linked to them
(category 2); and
• “Integrated policy learning” deals with the degree of goal and target specification (category 1),
as well as the availability of policy assessment tools, such as monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms (category 2).
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As such, our approach limits certain governance for SD principles to different stages in the
policy cycle, whereas other approaches might focus on one principle along the whole cycle, or vice
versa. Restricting our analysis to the policy cycle brings certain limitations, in particular, during the
agenda-setting phase, which is a feature of the “clumsy solution” approach described above. Instead,
our analysis provides a more comprehensive picture when the paper investigates “clumsy processes”
along three stages of the policy cycle. In the subsequent analysis, the paper explores how NMS address
“wickedness” of governing the sustainable and secure mineral supply through governance for SD
principles. Moreover, the author attempts to identify best practices and key dynamics of the process
through a comparative analysis of NMS in five EU MS.
6. Results
The first part of this chapter outlines the policy genealogy and how specific EU Member State
conditions are considered. In the second part, the author analyses the degree to which governance for
SD principles (see Table 1) are applied during the design, implementation, and revision stage of NMS.
By doing so, the paper investigates key features: (1) inclusive actor strategy; (2) strategic follow-up
implementation; and (3) integrated policy learning.
6.1. Policy Genealogy and Driving Forces
For all the five country cases (Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden), their current
NMS was the first umbrella policy strategy encompassing a strategic approach towards a secure and
sustainable supply to domestic mineral raw materials. Prior to this development, none of the five
countries had a coherent and strategic approach. Instead, these countries only had a mix of stand-alone
instruments addressing different issues, such as land-use planning (i.e., managing competing land use
choices such as mining or agriculture), covering different materials and different industrial sectors.
Only in the case of Greece was mineral policy managed through a tripartite approach of three different
laws that formed a more coherent framework compared to the other four countries.
In four of the five countries (Finland, Portugal, Greece and Sweden), the EU level policy
framework—the 2008 RMI—was the common driver for initiating the development of their NMS.
The case of Austria is different in that the Ministry of Economy in 2001 proposed to the national
parliament the development of an overall strategy for a more coherent policy approach. Consecutive
parliamentary debates, on the one hand, and coordination and negotiation with the regions, on the
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other hand, between 2001 and 2010 lead to the government’s adoption of the NMS and its initiation
in 2010.
Apart from the European Commission providing a major impetus for the development of NMS,
national framework conditions strongly contributed to their development and focus. In the case
of Sweden and Finland, economic factors played a major role. In these two countries, a “mining
boom”, due to increased investments in mining and exploration activities, led to augmented political
awareness of the mining sector’s activities. The Finnish interviewee highlighted that the “[ . . . ] strong
increase in mining and exploration activities at national level, which brought the sector to the political
agenda”, went so far that “[ . . . ] minerals issues where mentioned in the government programme”.
In contrast, environmental challenges and more effective land use planning (avoiding conflicts in
use and guaranteeing access to important mineral deposits) were vital concerns for the development
of the Austrian and Greek NMS. Moreover, in Austria and Greece, public acceptance for on-going and
future mining projects influenced NMS development.
In addition, Table 2 provides some background information with regard to the country’s domestic
extraction figures, the socio-economic importance of the sector for employment, and the attractiveness
for private sector investment according to the legislative and policy framework [74–76].
Table 2. Country background information on domestic extraction, employment and
investment attractiveness.
Austria Sweden Finland Portugal Greece
Domestic extraction of metal ores
in 2016 (tonnes) 3319.089 79,028.485 21,972.056 11,881.668 4572.629
Domestic extraction of metal ores
(per cent change 2000–2016) +45.36% +65.57% +558.14% +14.02% −4.96%
Domestic extraction of non-metallic
minerals in 2016 (tonnes) 108,641.427 99,591.772 98,433.49 101,071.714 57,288.256
Domestic extraction non-metallic
minerals (per cent change 2000–2016) −7.96% +33.09% −7.54% −20.44% +65.27%
Jobs in mining and quarrying in 2014
(employed persons) 6265 10,847 6318 9355 6037
jobs in mining and quarrying
(per cent change 2008–2014) −1.23% +12.14% +19.16% −30.32% +4.39%
Policy Perception Index in 2014
(Rank among 122 jurisdictions) No data available 4th 2nd 40th 82nd
6.2. Inclusive Actor Strategy
The governance for SD principles “horizontal policy integration” and “participation” refer
to (governmental and non-governmental) actor involvement throughout the whole policy cycle.
The paper investigated the degree of actors’ involvement during the design and implementation of the
respective NMS
6.2.1. Participation of Actors in Strategy Design
Depending on where mineral policy was situated in the administration of the respective country,
the Ministry of Environment (GR: Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, PT: General
Directorate of Natural Resources, Security and Maritime Services) or the Ministry of Economics
(Austria, Finland and Sweden) had the main responsibility for the policy design process.
The five countries are characterised by different degrees of actor collaboration during the NMS
design phase: (1) “exclusive”/”limited”; (2) “partially inclusive”/”medium”; and (3) “fully inclusive”/
“broad” strategy development processes. These categories refer to the degree of involvement of:
(i) “governmental organisation actors” (GO actors i.e., ministries); and (ii) “non-governmental actors”
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(Non-GO i.e., industry, academic and private research institutions, and civil society organisations,
such as environmental NGOs). Figure 3 depicts the analysis categories in a two-dimensional graph.
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NB: x-axis analysis category “GO (ministry) actor involvement”: Exclusive development
(cooperation with only one other ministry); Partially inclusive development (two other ministries);
fully Inclusive development (more than 2 ministries); SE was characterised by development
process involving all ministries; y-axis analysis category “Non-GO actor involvement” (also
including non-ministry government organisations such as local and regional authorities): Limited
external involve ent (industry; research—public or private; public body—only geological survey);
mediu external involvement (in addition other public bodies such as regional or local authorities,
environmental agencies etc.); Broad external involvement (in addition other CSO stakeholders such as
labour associations, environ ental and social civil society organisations etc.).
The “exclusive” and “li ited” design approach applied by the Greek Ministry of Environment
involved only a limited nu ber of GO and Non-GO actors. For example, only one industry association
and two academic institutions have been involved in the NMS design process. The Greek interviewee
explained that, because of the concentration of competences, the sole responsibility for developing the
NMS was within one inistry: “[ . . . ] in the same ministry, we could solve the problems of mining
from a economical, technological and environmental point of view”.
Contrastingly, the Swedish NMS is characterised as being fully “inclusive” and uses a “broad”
design approach. Not only have all government ministries bee consulted and involved, but also a
broad variety of Non-GO actors, covering industry, academic and private research, as well as civil
society and environmental organisations. Essentially, as pointed out by the Swedish interviewee,
policy-making processes in Sweden are characterised by a strong focus on collaborative approaches
in the sense that “it is never one ministry which takes the decision; [ . . . ] in order to put forward a
project like this, all the ministries have to approve”.
Given the variety of different GO and Non-GO actors involved, the respective responsible
ministries developed different coordination mechanisms (i.e., negotiating the content, commenting on
drafts and providing expertise). For example, Greece applied a rather lose form of coordination by
establishing informal ad-hoc and on-demand meetings between public administrators and Non-GO
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actors involved. Contrastingly, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Portugal set up coordination mechanisms
on a regular and pre-established basis (i.e., official meetings, such as internal working groups or plenary
meetings). In the case of Sweden and Finland, decisions on high level political meetings, such as
steering groups chaired by permanent ministry secretaries (FI) or ministers (SE), steered the work of
these meetings. Essentially, interviewees from Sweden and Finland reported that high level political
meetings positively affected commitment during later stage implementation, as “the steering group
secured continued implementation efforts without budget allocation”.
Both Austria and Finland are characterised by a “partially inclusive” design approach, involving
two ministries (FI: the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy)
in the process, but a varying degree of Non-GO involvement. Remarkably, in Finland, while not
originally planned, Non-GO involvement increased considerably during later stage implementation:
The Finnish interviewee described that during the policy design stage, the responsible ministry was
not aware of the role environmental NGOs could play, for example, in facilitating a social license
to operate. The interviewee explained that “[we thought], environmental issues were [sufficiently]
covered by the Ministry of Environment and environmental authorities”. The major impetus for
involving Non-GO actors in the later stage originated in public debate: “In the years following the
adoption of the 2010 strategy [ . . . ] the social license to operate principle became quite prominent in
the public sphere—especially through the media—and, thus, NGOs and representatives of indigenous
people have been involved in the further policy process (i.e., the 2013 action plan)”. On the contrary,
the Austrian approach intentionally and ex-ante decided to involve a variety of Non-GOs, as “mining
and mineral extraction affairs are a sensitive case in Austria and, thus, it was very helpful to bring
nearly all stakeholders together on one table [ . . . ] to facilitate required acceptance in long and intense
sessions and negotiations”.
While Portugal, Austria, and Sweden all shared a “broad” participation of Non-GO actors, the
means of involvement during the design stage varied: In Austria, for example, an institutionalised form
of involvement of business/industry associations and labour unions in the policy decision-making
process (“Sozialpartnerschaft”) played an important role for bringing in Non-GO perspectives. On the
other hand, Sweden and Portugal engaged in a more deliberate and loose way of involvement:
For example, the Swedish coordinating ministry organised four dialogue meetings and sent out
requests for written feedback to 300 organisations, in order to “have as many people as possible
attending and that anyone could provide input”.
According to Prno and Slocombe [64] and Zhang and Moffat [5], the reasoning and benefits
behind such multi-actor approaches are manifold: Involvement of different actors, as in the case of
Portugal, Sweden and Austria, has the potential to bring the most controversial issues ex-ante into the
policy debate and problem formulation process and, consequently, anticipate or mitigate potentially
conflicting developments. The Swedish interviewee also indicated that “of course there were conflicting
opinions between ministries during the design of the strategy, but such conflicts had to be resolved
before the strategy was adopted at the ministerial meeting and, thus, became a governmental decision”.
Similarly, the Austrian interviewee reported that “reaching acceptance required long and intense
sessions and negotiations with stakeholders”. However, broad actor involvement fulfilled a dual
purpose with regard to: (i) expertise by “bringing experts of the respective stakeholder groups together
to analyse the topics at hand”; and (ii) legitimisation by “bringing nearly all stakeholders together at
one table, and, especially, those that are usually opposed to mineral extraction [ . . . ]”.
6.2.2. Participation of Non-GO Actors in Strategy Implementation
The paper subsequently explored the extent to which Non-GOs are taken on board during the
implementation of actions of the respective NMS. The author identified three different approaches for
strategy implementation and the role Non-GOs play: (1) “on-demand collaborative implementation”;
(2) “shared but differentiated implementation”; and (3) “consult-and-forget implementation”. With
regards to “on-demand collaborative implementation”, the Greek NMS was mainly implemented
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by ministries (i.e., Ministry of Environment supported by other ministries where responsibilities
overlap), while Non-GOs were involved on an ad-hoc and on-demand basis in consultation procedures
or committees. The Austrian NMS presents a similar case: The interviewee argued that Non-GO
involvement was limited to a supportive role during the policy design phase due to the fact that
responsibility for implementing the main policy instrument (i.e., land use planning) was not located
on national ministerial level, but rather on the level of the nine Austrian regions.
An implementation approach with a higher degree of Non-GO involvement, “shared but
differentiated implementation”, was applied in the NMS of Sweden and Portugal: The Swedish
government appointed other public authorities (e.g., geological survey innovation agencies, regional
authority) responsible for implementation of individual actions, supported by a range of Non-GO
actors. More specifically, the government provided the framework conditions (i.e., financing, goals and
targets, time-frames, monitoring), whereas public authorities enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom
and independence during the implementation process. However, the Swedish interviewee pointed out
that the government advises the authorities to “[ . . . ] consult with the relevant stakeholders [...] and
in some cases [we] mention with which stakeholders [we] want the authorities to collaborate with”.
A similar approach was applied in Portugal, where GO actors are fully responsible for individual
actions, while Non-GO actors play a supportive role during implementation.
In contrast to the design phase, Finland’s NMS allowed for the highest level of involvement and
autonomy during implementation compared to the other four cases. Generally, the responsibility for
implementing action proposals (outlined in the 2013 action plan) is split between different Non-GO
actors. Government steering is limited, insofar as the action plan only comprises non-binding advice
on the actors’ involvement and provides opportunities for new actors entering action proposals.
Actors leading proposals make up a broad variety, such as industry associations or environmental
NGOs. As outlined in the previous section, the major impetus for involving Non-GOs in the later
implementation stage came from the public sphere and the media. Finland, Sweden and Portugal
featured less inclusive actor participation during NMS implementation than design.
Since primary extraction challenges necessitate such multi-actor approaches (see also [4,5,64]),
these policy strategies, on the one hand, contribute to increased legitimacy for steering, and, on the
other hand, facilitate implementation of individual actions. More specifically, as outlined by several
authors [11,57,60], establishing more inclusive participation can positively impact, for example, on
public perception of mining or the social license to operate. Conversely, while the Greek NMS identifies
conflicts with local communities for on-going and future mining projects as one of the major drivers
for its inception, Non-GO involvement during both design and implementation remained limited.
Following these arguments, this might have future ramifications on building trust for a social license
to operate.
6.3. Strategic Follow-Up Implementation
This part of the analysis addresses the governance for SD principle “long-term visioning and
short-term action”. The author examined how NMS define a long-term vision for minerals supply in
the context of SD. More concretely, the analysis focuses on the extent to which the NMS outlines a
concrete strategy follow-up (i.e., action plan/follow up implementation plan) and implementation
time planning.
To better understand the nature of different NMS’ follow-up implementation, the author
categorised the following: (1) “single action only”; (2) “partial” implementation; and (3) “elaborated”
action plan for implementation. The author also distinguishes between three classifications for
implementation time frames: (1) “unspecific/undifferentiated”; (2) “overall/end-of-strategy”-based;
and (3) “differentiated/individual action”-based.
NB: x-axis analysis category “Concrete strategy follow up”: single action only (i.e., no concrete
implementation plan/implementation steps foreseen for actions outlined in the strategy; follow
up of actions in an ad-hoc and un-systematic way); Partial (i.e., includes some planning aspects
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such as a financing of actions in the implementation framework); Elaborated (existence of a
follow up implementation or action plan of the Strategy); y-axis analysis category “Implementation
time planning”: No time planning (i.e., un-specified time plan for action implementation);
overall/end-of strategy (i.e., overall but un-differentiated time planning exists for all actions);
Differentiated/individual action based (i.e., comprehensive time-planning differentiated among
various actions).
At a first glance, the patterns of specific time frames, actions, and overall implementation
frameworks formed two rather homogenous groups among the five NMS (see also Figure 4). While
Greece, Austria, and Sweden lack a concrete implementation plan or roadmap, Finland (“Sustainable
Extractive Industry Action Plan”) and Portugal (“Action Plan ENRG-RM 2020”) have both developed
a separate action plan.
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For Austria and Greece, the author identified a “single action only” implementation scheme
(no concrete action plan or implementation framework) with an “unspecific/undifferentiated” time
schedule for individual actions. The Greek interviewee explained that, for the NMS, there exists
“[ . . . ] no concrete time plan from the beginning [ . . . and that the] strategy is quite general”. Slight
variations exist with regard to time planning: While the Greek NMS pursues a mix of short- and
long-term actions, the Austrian NMS’ major instrument is under continuous negotiation with the
regions for changing their legislation accordingly. Thus, the author characterised their implementation
as a continuous process with no concrete time planning.
The “partial” and “overall/end-of-strategy-based” implementation in Sweden refers to an
implementation framework that considers both an overall time frame (three years) for short- and
longer-term actions, as well as a specific financial framework for that given period. Remarkably, in the
case of Sweden, the interviewee pointed out that the “ . . . government provides the authorities (e.g.,
geological survey innovation agencies, municipalities) with the overall framework until 2016, and
they develop the tasks as they see fit”, and, moreover, that “[ . . . ] it gives quite a lot of freedom to the
authorities to develop from their expertise and knowledge”.
The “elaborated” and “differentiated-individual-action” implementation in Finland and Portugal
relates to a policy action plan that encompasses differentiated and specific implementation time frames
across clearly specified short- and longer-term actions. In this regard, the Portuguese action plan offers
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a well differentiated approach on the level of individual actions: The interviewee highlighted that
the actions are comprehensively outlined by (1) an “[ . . . ] indication of sponsors (i.e., funding sources)
[ . . . ] (2) stakeholder consortia for implementing individual actions [as well as] (3) the macro calendar
(i.e., overall time planning of the action plan) [and], a detailed timetable for action [representing] the
model, to accompany each course of action”.
6.4. Integrated Policy Learning
Another important building block of governance for SD refers to the concept of “reflexivity
and learning” as an ability to adapt to changing conditions within a given system. The following
highlights instruments for monitoring and evaluation applied in NMS to either adapt to changing
framework conditions or respond to varying degrees of action implementation and follow-up of
targets. Moreover, to enable policy learning—e.g., to link the overall strategy level with concrete and
individual implementation actions—there needs to be overall and broad objectives on the level of the
NMS, and, at the same time, targets and indicators attributable to individual implementation actions
and actors.
Thus, for the analysis feature “integrated policy learning” (Figure 5), the paper further
distinguishes between two conceptually related categories: The availability of overall objectives in
combination with measureable targets (“objective and target specification”), providing clear guidance
for implementation by means of various “monitoring and evaluation tools”.
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NB: x-axis analysis category “objective and target specification”: uniform (the strategy only
comprises overall and uniform objectives which cannot be attributed to specific actors or specific
actions foreseen; actor or action-specific (targets can be attached to single/individual actions or
actors); actor and action-specific: y axis analysis category “monitoring and evaluation framework”:
no monitoring and evaluation framework (i.e., no indicator framework or qualitative reporting);
Qualitative evaluation only (i.e., assessment and evaluation report); qualitative evaluation and
indicator frameworks.
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Generally, the five NMS exhibit quite diverse policy learning systems, ranging from applying
simple mechanisms of monitoring and reporting, towards more sophisticated and comprehensive
approaches for institutionalised learning in NMS.
Greece reported nine broad objectives in its NMS, for which no monitoring or evaluation
mechanism (i.e., no indicator or qualitative evaluation frameworks) exists. However, efforts are
currently being undertaken to develop a monitoring framework and a list of quantifiable targets.
Similarly, in Austria, the main criteria for successful implementation is the translation of the major
instrument (land use planning law) into regional law. However, no current monitoring and evaluation
system exists to measure its implementation progress at the federal level.
The Swedish NMS applies a mixed approach of two horizontal objectives that are complemented
by several targets linked to 12 action areas. However, no concrete indicator framework exists for
measuring these targets. Instead, the responsible authorities produce a yearly qualitative evaluation
report. This report not only informs the government and all involved actors, but also a wider group of
stakeholders at a yearly forum meeting.
On the other end of the scale, Finland and Portugal developed the most comprehensive system in
terms of monitoring and evaluation tools. Both Finland’s and Portugal’s NMS feature quantitative,
as well as qualitative, policy assessment schemes. Finland’s monitoring and evaluation approach
developed not only the assessment of progress for individual actions (i.e., benchmarking for measuring
progress towards the target), but also assessed the impact of its individual actions (i.e., the actual
impact on the ground).
7. Discussion
The selected five EU Member States NMS demonstrate diverse governance constellations when
combining the three analysis key features of governance for SD (see Table 2). It is interesting to
observe that, while all five NMS follow the same strategic objective of establishing a secure and
sustainable supply of mineral raw materials, notable differences exist regarding their governance for
SD approaches. Although no “one-size-fits-all” recipe for a best practice case exists among the five
NMS, Portugal, Finland, and Sweden meet high standards with regard to the inclusion of governance
for SD principles as a “clumsy solution” approach to a “wicked problem”. Therefore, the author argues
that these three NMS provide the best governance framework conditions for achieving secure mineral
supply in the context of SD. In this regard, Table 3 displays the five NMS point scores according to
their position in the coordinate system in each of the three analysis features (see Figures 3–5).
Table 3. Comparison of the three analysis features depicting different governance for SD constellations
in five EU MS NMS.
Inclusive Actor Strategy Strategic Follow upImplementation
Integrated Policy
Learning
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the x-axis analysis category, respectively (totalling six points), whereas Finland situated in the centre
scores two points for the y-axis and the x-axis analysis category, respectively (totalling four points).
Briefly, the paper discusses here how the application of governance for SD principles in NMS as a
“clumsy solutions” approach can help to address the “wicked problem” of sustainable mineral supply.
The author does so by outlining the implications of our three analysis key features on the characteristics
of “wicked problems”, in general, as well as on the concrete example of mineral supply challenges:
• Sustainable mineral supply is characterised by “wicked problem” dynamics, such as different
actor interests and capacities (“social pluralism”), organisational fragmentation or silo-thinking
(“institutional complexity”). Thus, the more inclusive strategies of Sweden, Austria and,
to a lesser extent, Finland and Portugal, support respective “clumsy” solution approaches
or, more specifically, more deliberative or participatory policy-making. As also outlined by
Everingham et al. [4] (pp. 597–598), these NMS potentially contribute to (i) responsibility sharing;
(ii) increased legitimacy for steering; (iii) design and implementation of policy instruments
(e.g., land use planning tools or licensing procedures considering civil society interests); or
(iv) translating these efforts or attitudes into a local context, where social license to operate is
particularly relevant. Creating this arena and culture for participatory decision-making in NMS
potentially facilitates trust and cooperation among actors in sustainable mining projects on the
ground [5,60,64]. Conversely, in Greece, where, according to Menegaki and Kaliampakos [8]
(p. 1437), “reactions against mining remain intense”, efforts on participatory policy-making
are marginal compared to other EU MS NMS and, thus, may cause less favourable
framework conditions.
• Mining sector challenges, such as mining impacts on ecosystems, or business investment decisions
for prospection, have to deal with institutional complexity and unknown long-term dynamics
in the future. Thus, a “clumsy” solution approach needs to consider both long-term visioning
and short-term action, as well as integrative implementation. In that sense, Finland and Portugal
provide a best practice case through a balanced combination of (i) long-term envisioning (i.e., a set
of broad objectives), and, at the same time; (ii) strategic design for concrete actions (i.e., policy
action plan) that provide clarity for future policy developments [77]. As outlined by Head and
Alford [13] (p. 731), flexible framework conditions (degrees of financial and steering freedom for
individual action) combined with collaborative leadership (i.e., multi-actor consortia), as applied
by Sweden, Finland and Portugal, allow for more adaptive and context-specific implementation.
• The fact that there exists no blueprint for a sustainable extractive sector, and that information
needed to take adequate policy decisions is fragmented (“scientific uncertainty”), requires
continuously evaluating and adapting current practices. Thus, applying integrated policy learning
approaches (e.g., combining qualitative and quantitative evaluation) allows for both reflexivity
and learning. Essentially, countries, such as Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Finland, facilitate this
flexibility through a comprehensive policy revision process and reduce uncertainty by bringing
in collective knowledge from more inclusive policy design and implementation. Contrastingly,
Hertin et al. [78] (p. 1185) argue that the actual synergetic relationship is questionable, as,
for example, more instrumental and formal policy learning approaches can act as a barrier to
open deliberation and the utilization of stakeholder knowledge.
However, as outlined by Jordan [16], it is yet to be explored whether there exists a direct
causal relationship between governance for SD approaches and the actual policy outcomes “on the
ground”. Even though our results indicate that most NMS are fairly well outfitted with governance
for SD processes, we need further research about their actual contribution to achieving policy goals.
Taking into account that governance for SD tries to remedy most common policy implementation
failures. As outlined by Howes et al. [79], NMS can be considered as a framework facilitating policy
implementation at the strategic level.
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Particularly, when drawing lessons from SD policy-making, the task ahead for mineral policy
practitioners appears to be not less ambitious: One could argue that while SD practitioners, despite their
in-depth understanding and decade-long experience in dealing with “wicked problems” (a sustainable
development transition), have struggled to achieve policy goals [80–82], it does not mean that it is
not worth trying to implement “clumsy solution” approach of governance for SD in NMS for mineral
policy practitioners. Given the large amount of sectoral strategies, an investigation of the actual “policy
content” (for examples see [29]) would add to the understanding of governance approaches effectively
delivering policy goals. To capture the impacts of different governance approaches, Lange et al. [83]
emphasize the need to investigate relationships among political processes (politics), institutional
structures (polity), and policy content (policy) (see also [84,85]). As is the case within this paper,
there are a few examples where general institutional structures affect governance processes in EU MS
mineral policy: The involvement of business/industry associations and labour unions in the policy
decision-making process (“Sozialpartnerschaft”) in Austria, or high level political steering meetings
in Sweden or Finland. Thus, future research on politics, policy and polity aspects in different EU
Member States and their contextualisation with different governance approaches would allow for a
more nuanced picture.
While Lange et al. [83] argue for a more contextualised picture of governance approaches, our
analysis bridges the theoretical with the practical perspective: the paper investigated whether policy
strategies are fit-for-purpose regarding their translation into practice of prescriptive and normative
governance for SD principles. Or, paraphrasing the view of Lafferty and Meadowcroft [86] (p. 2),
the author strived to not only add to the “great deal of discursive ‘smoke’”, but also to provide “[ . . . ]
empirical ‘fire’”. More specifically, these NMS display practical examples for the integration of
governance for SD in sectorial concerns with both high political relevance for the EU Commission
(EU RMI, EIP raw materials) and EU MS level, as well as contested societal/social and environmental
challenges. Thus, applying appropriate governance processes offers both an opportunity and a
challenge for mining sector actors, as well as proponents of SD. Our paper, therefore, contributes not
only to a wider debate in academia, but also informs policy practitioners along two fronts: Firstly,
mineral policy practitioners who are primarily concerned about governance processes and their
implications for delivering policy goals. Secondly, SD policy practitioners who are interested in how a
governance for SD framework is implemented in sectoral policy settings, especially at times when SD
remains marginalised or camouflaged [87] (p. 967).
8. Conclusions
By utilising a broad framework of governance principles and investigating whether these can
be found in policy strategies, the author demonstrated how public institutions deal with “wicked
problems”. The paper provided a nuanced picture on practical applications of these governance
principles along the whole policy cycle and identified fit-for-purpose approaches best reflecting each
aspect of the selected governance for SD spectrum. The author argues that decision makers need
to pursue this maxim of holisticity to address the entirety of a “wicked problem’s” dynamics, and,
consequently, set the right framework conditions to achieve sustainable development in the mining
sector. Public institutions adopting such an approach will benefit from increased commitment and
legitimacy, as well as more effective policy instrument implementation in the future and, thus, be more
likely to achieve policy outcomes. Beyond the arena of mineral policy, such approaches will be
particularly relevant for upcoming EU MS Strategies following up on recent developments, such as
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (see for example [42]) or the EU Action Plan for the
Circular Economy.
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Appendix A
Interviewee for National Strategy for Geological Resources—Mineral Resources: Director of the
Mines and Quarries Department responsible for supervision of the mining and quarrying activities
within its legal framework part of the Direção-General de Energia e Geologia DGEG belonging to the
Ministry of Environment, Land Use Planning and Energy (MAOTE).
Interviewee for Sweden’s Minerals Strategy: Head of Section; Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and
Communications; project leader of the mineral strategy.
Interviewee for Greek National Policy for the Exploitation of Mineral Resources: Head of the
department of safety and regulations in the General Directorate of Natural Wealth; Ministry of
Environment, Energy & Climate Change of the Hellenic Republic; in charge of NMS co-development
with other colleagues in the Directorate.
Interviewee for Austrian Mineral Resources Plan: Head of Unit—Minerals policy; Federal Ministry
of Science, Research and Economy; person in charge of co-development of the Austrian Rohstoffplan.
Interviewee for Finland’s Minerals Strategy: Chief Inspector of Mines, Mineral Policy
and Legislation; Ministry of Employment and the Economy (FI); person in charge of national
mineral policies.
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